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Abstract
Economic theory that underlies many empirical microeconomic applications pre-
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for multiple testing to avoid an overestimation of positive treatment effects. These
tests uncover evidence of policy-relevant heterogeneous effects from information provi-
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1 Introduction
Individuals differ not only in their characteristics but also in how they respond to a partic-
ular treatment or intervention. Therefore, treatment effects may vary between subgroups
defined by individual characteristics such as gender or race. For example, programs that
provide information on schools’ performance on standardized tests may lead to a different
likelihood that parents “vote with their feet” and move their child to a better school based
on parental characteristics such as their education. Similarly, welfare programs that provide
work incentives may affect welfare recipients differently according to their demographic and
socioeconomic characteristics such as education or number and ages of children. In addition,
individuals’ response to a particular treatment may vary across quantiles of the unconditional
outcome distribution. After all, if a school information provision program improves the odds
that a child’s performance relative to her peers can be correctly perceived by the parents,
parental responses such as switching schools may vary with the child’s relative performance.1
This diverse and heterogeneous behavior has not only changed how economists think
about econometric models and policy evaluation but also has profound consequences for the
scientific evaluation of public policy.2 Although the importance of heterogeneous treatment
effects is widely recognized in the causal inference literature, common practice remains to
report an average causal effect parameter, even in cases where it is not possible to identify
to which subset of individuals this effect applies.3
While an increasing number of studies account for possible treatment effect heterogene-
ity when evaluating either education policies or social programs, most conduct statistical
inference without allowing for dependence across subgroups. For example, Fink, McConnell,
and Vollmer (2014) report that over 75 percent of studies that analyze data from field ex-
periments published in 10 specific journals estimate separate average causal parameters for
different subgroups. Fink, McConnell, and Vollmer (2014) argue that it is inappropriate
in those studies to apply traditional standard errors and p-values when testing for hetero-
geneous treatment effects through interaction terms or subgroup analyses. After all, each
interaction term represents a separate hypothesis beyond the original experimental design
1Similarly, welfare programs induce kinks in the recipients’ budget constraint, so the treatment effect
may also vary depending on their pre-treatment earnings.
2James Heckman stresses this point in his 2001 Nobel lecture, where he notes that conditional mean
impacts including the average treatment effect may provide limited guidance for policy design and imple-
mentation (Heckman, 2001).
3In particular, a large academic debate (e.g., Deaton, 2010; Heckman and Urzua, 2010; Imbens, 2010)
questions whether the local average treatment effect parameter obtained from an IV estimand has policy
relevance.
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and results in a substantially increased type I error.4 Lee and Shaikh (2014) address this
issue in their study of data from a randomized experiment by adopting a multiple testing
procedure for subgroup treatment effects that controls the family-wise error rate (FWER)
in finite samples.
A similar observation can be made for distributional treatment effects. A growing num-
ber of studies examine if there are different treatment effects across quantiles of the outcome
variable, i.e. they estimate quantile treatment effects (QTEs) (e.g., Heckman, Smith, and
Clements, 1997; Friedlander and Robins, 1997; Abadie, 2002; Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes,
2006; Firpo, 2007). Individual test statistics at different quantiles involve their sample coun-
terparts across different quantiles, which are correlated. A naive approach of comparing
individual test results to find quantile groups with positive and statistically significant treat-
ment effects inevitably suffers from the issue of data mining due to the reuse of the same
data as emphasized by White (2000).5 In Online Appendix A, we examine all articles that
estimate distributional causal parameters which were published in five high-impact economic
journals between 2008–2017, and find that in none of these articles did the authors make
corrections for multiple testing.
In this paper, we show that making these corrections is important by reexamining the
effectiveness of a market level “soft” accountability policy that consists of reporting informa-
tion on student and school test score performance to parents.6 Our contribution is to apply a
multiple testing procedure to analyze different dimensions of treatment effect heterogeneity
across subgroups and outcome quantiles. Our flexible approach allows us to analyze treat-
ment effect heterogeneity using various hypothesis testing procedures. First, investigating
the existence of positive treatment effects for some subgroups or some outcome quantiles is
formulated as a hypothesis testing problem. Second, the procedure enables us to identify the
subgroups and outcome quantiles for which the treatment effect is estimated to be conspicu-
ous beyond sampling variations. As the result is obtained through a formal multiple testing
procedure, it properly takes into account the reuse of the same data for different demographic
4The problem when testing multiple hypotheses jointly is the potential over-rejection of the null hypoth-
esis. Intuitively, if the null hypothesis of no treatment effect is true, testing it across 100 subsamples, we
expect about five rejections at the 95 percent confidence level. However, if these subsamples depend on each
other, more than five rejections may occur. Hence, the type I error would exceed the nominal level of the
test. The same issue arises when testing a hypothesis across the percentiles of an outcome variable, as we
discuss below.
5In part as a response, statistical inference procedures developed in Heckman, Smith, and Clements
(1997), Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens (2002), Rothe (2010), and Maier (2011), among others, focus on the
whole distribution of potential outcomes to side-step multiple comparisons.
6We focus on programs that disclose information on student performance and differs from “hard” ac-
countability programs that tie the pay (and in some case punishments are used in place of rewards) of
educators to student test scores.
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groups or quantile groups and controls the FWER so that it is unaffected by data mining.7
Controlling the FWER in multiple comparisons across different quantiles is crucial for the
validity of the inference procedure, as estimated treatment effects across different quantiles
of the outcome distribution are not independent.8
Our use of various formal testing procedures for treatment effect heterogeneity is not
solely motivated by policy considerations, but also economic theory.9 The multiple testing
approach provides not only a basis for judging the empirical relevance of treatment effect
heterogeneity. It also provides further information on the pattern of treatment effect hetero-
geneity across different population groups.10 This information can offer important insights
about how scarce social resources are to be distributed by giving policymakers rich infor-
mation to more effectively assign different treatments to individuals.11 For example, policy-
7More specifically, our procedure involves multiple inequalities of unconditional quantile functions, and
draws on a bootstrap method for testing for inequality restrictions. To construct a multiple testing procedure
that controls the FWER, i.e. the probability of falsely rejecting at least one true hypothesis, we adapt the
step-down method proposed by Romano and Wolf (2005a) to our context of testing multiple inequalities of
unconditional quantiles.
8Prior work does not consider conditional quantiles and as mentioned in the text, Lee and Shaikh (2014)
also adopt a multiple testing procedure to identify subgroups of conspicuous treatment effects. However, there
are several notable differences. First, in contrast to our approach, they do not account for within-subgroup
treatment effect heterogeneity. Second, Lee and Shaikh (2014) require the treatment to be randomly assigned
unconditionally. In contrast, our approach permits selection on observables. Hence it accommodates non-
experimental data whenever this assumption is deemed plausible. List, Shaikh, and Xu (2016) extend the
multiple testing corrections developed in Lee and Shaikh (2014) to additionally consider an experimental
settings with multiple treatments, multiple outcomes, and multiple subgroups, but also do not account for
within subgroup treatment effect heterogeneity.
9In Online Appendix D, we provide an additional empirical demonstration where we test for treatment
effect heterogeneity that is also motivated by an economic model. Specifically, we use a simple static model
of labor supply that predicts heterogenous responses to changes in the parameters of a welfare reform policy
within and between subgroups. To illustrate the tests we explore the extent of heterogeneity in labor supply
responses in the Jobs First welfare experiment across percentiles of the earnings distribution.
10Our primary goal is not to develop tests to see if observed behavior is consistent with the quantitative
predictions of a theory but rather whether qualitative differences in the pattern of QTEs between subgroups
emerge. Our approach differs from Crump et al. (2008) in several aspects. First, Crump et al. (2008) focus
on heterogeneity of the average treatment effect across subgroups, while our focus is on treatment effect
heterogeneity across quantiles of the outcome distribution, motivated by the findings of Bitler, Gelbach, and
Hoynes (2006). Second, Crump et al. (2008) use a joint test for treatment effect heterogeneity covering all the
subgroups. In contrast, we use a multiple testing procedure to detect quantiles and/or subgroups for which
there is a positive treatment effect. Finally, unlike Crump et al. (2008), we also investigate treatment effect
heterogeneity across quantiles within each subgroup, so that the focus here is also on whether treatment
effect heterogeneity across quantiles is mostly due to subgroup differences or not.
11Our interest is not in optimal treatment assignment in the spirit of Manski (2004), Dehejia (2005), and
others. Armstrong and Shen (2015) recently extended optimal treatment assignment to additionally consider
multiple testing procedures for treatment effects that control for the FWER. In contrast, we do not assume
that the researcher ex ante has full knowledge of the distribution of outcomes in the population or of the
social planner’s welfare function as in the above papers and Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018), among others.
Our interest is rather to propose a multiple testing framework for identifying subpopulations with positive
responses to the outcome variable.
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makers can use the results to modify the design of accountability programs more effectively
if they were to know which parents respond to market-level information on school quality.
These parents may differ systematically by predetermined characteristics or be characterized
by being located between specific percentiles of their child’s test score distribution.
The results of this paper contribute to a burgeoning empirical literature surveyed in
Figlio and Loeb (2011) that explores how school accountability programs impact education
outcomes. Economists have long argued that policies designed to increase competition in
markets for education can improve educational outcomes by increasing disadvantaged stu-
dents’ access to high quality schools, and by causing under-performing schools to become
more effective or to shrink as families “vote with their feet” (Friedman, 1955; Becker, 1995;
Hoxby, 2003). Further, by disclosing information about student and school performance,
educators may change their effort since this affects the (implicit) market incentives faced
by schools. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that providing information about school-level
achievement directly to parents can influence school choice in the United States (Hastings and
Weinstein, 2008), Canada (Friesen et al., 2012), the Netherlands (Koning and Van der Wiel,
2012), Brazil (Camargo et al., 2018), and Pakistan (Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja, 2017).12
However, school performance has also been found to not be the main determinant of choice
and that preferences regarding schools are heterogeneous across socioeconomic groups in the
United States (Hastings, Kane, and Staiger, 2009), Chile (Schneider, Elacqua, and Buckley,
2006), Pakistan (Carneiro, Das, and Reis, 2013), and the United Kingdom (Gibbons and
Machin, 2006).
These findings of heterogeneous responses that appear in many studies are consistent with
economic theory and provide a setting to illustrate our methods that examine treatment effect
heterogeneity. We reexamine data from Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2017) and also make
an important methodological contribution to the literature that tests for treatment effect
heterogeneity. While Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2017) allow for multiple tests across
subgroups, we also adjust for dependencies between quantiles within subgroups. Thereby,
we provide a unified framework to test for treatment effect heterogeneity.
We present evidence that these corrections are empirically important and policy rele-
vant. In our application, slightly over 65 percent of the estimated statistically significant
QTEs become insignificant once multiple testing corrections are applied. These findings
also demonstrate that the significantly positive effects of providing information to parents
12The amount of parental response may depend on the type of information provided. Mizala and Urquiola
(2013) provide evidence from Chile that when absolute measures of school achievement are already widely
available, there are no changes in enrollment level and socioeconomic composition from receiving an additional
highly publicized award.
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reported in Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2017) are concentrated in the bottom quintile of the
test score distribution. We also find that these tests not only generate new insights allowing
researchers to better inform policy audiences but are important since recent work by Solon,
Haider, and Wooldridge (2015) has shown that researchers who estimate models that do not
account for heterogeneous effects may provide inconsistent estimates of average effects, even
when unconfoundedness holds (or with experimental data).13
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we motivate the tests that
we develop by describing the experiment and economic model that underlie the data be-
ing investigated. This model predicts heterogenous treatment effects both within and across
subgroups. The general testing procedures for treatment effect heterogeneity without and
with subgroups are described in Section 3. In Section 4, we present results from our em-
pirical application of the methods to the Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2017) experimental
data, which yields two main findings. First, while there is clear evidence of treatment effect
heterogeneity in the full sample, this is observed in most but not every subgroup. Second, we
demonstrate the importance of making corrections for multiple testing since approximately
65 percent of the QTEs become statistically insignificant when we account for potential de-
pendencies. Taken together, our results shed new light on the effectiveness of accountability
programs, further indicating how schools and parents respond to the release of information
on student performance. The concluding section 5 summarizes the contribution of using
these testing approaches in empirical microeconomic research and discusses directions for
future methodological work that can aid practitioners.
2 Experimental Design and Data
Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2017) conduct an experiment in 112 Pakistani villages to study
the impact of providing parents with a detailed two page report card on their child’s per-
formance and child’s school-level performance on a variety of outcomes. Each report card
contained the student’s test score and quintile rank (compared to all tested students) in
three subject areas, as well as for all of the schools in the village presented information
on i) the average score, number of children tested, and iii) quintile rank (across all schools
tested in the sample). In accountability systems, such school level report cards are frequently
13Under unconfoundedness, it is well known that matching and regression estimators may yield different
estimates since they weight observations differently. Intuitively if there are heterogeneous treatment effects
across groups in the sample, the OLS estimator gives a weighted average of these effects. The weights
depend not only on the frequency of the subgroups, but also upon sample variances within the subgroup.
This differs from the sample-weighted average which would be given by the average of each subgroup’s partial
effect weighted by its frequency in the sample.
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postulated to lead to improved parental investment decisions in education. The treatment
exogenously increased information in 56 of the 112 villages, and Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja
(2017) argue that each village can be viewed as an island economy where private and public
schools compete.14
The focus of Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2017) is to examine the gradient in the estimated
causal parameter of providing a report card along both the school type and baseline test
score distributions. It is important to stress that the institutional structure of education in
Pakistan offers several unique advantages that Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2017) exploit to
facilitate their study of how competition affects equilibrium school and student outcomes at
the market level. Rural villages in Pakistan are typically located at a great distance from
each other or are separated by natural barriers. Carneiro, Das, and Reis (2013) find that
parents of children in primary school in Pakistan often make enrollment decision that places
great weight on the physical distance from home to school. Second, within each village there
are multiple affordable private schools, and an estimated 35 percent of all students were
enrolled in private schools in 2005. Third, school inputs such as teacher education differ
sharply between government and private school and many private schools have a secular
orientation. There are very few if any regulations on the private schools that are generally
not supported by the government.
The idea that the gradient in the effect of increased information from the report card
will differ between public and private schools is consistent with predictions from models of
optimal pricing and quality choices in markets with asymmetric information (e.g., Wolin-
sky, 1983; Shapiro, 1983; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986). These models predict heterogenous
responses from improved information. The quality of initially low performing schools as
measured by student test scores will increase at a larger rate than responses in initially
high-quality schools; and under some assumptions on parental demand for school quality the
responses in high quality schools may even be negative. Camargo et al. (2014) develop an
alternative model in the spirit of Holmstro¨m (1999) of how test score disclosure would lead
to heterogenous changes in subsequent student test score performance between public and
private schools.15
Taken together, these economic models predict students and parents responding to in-
formation on school quality and their relative rank within a school, with heterogeneity pre-
14These villages are located in one of three selected districts in Pakistan’s most populous province, Punjab.
15The model they consider is pitched to be a reduced-form version of a dynamic model of managerial
effort along the lines of Holmstro¨m (1999).
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dicting larger behavioral responses to receiving a (more) negative signal.16 The extent of
this heterogeneity can vary across subgroups defined by school type, since administrators
in private schools may face greater pressure than public school counterparts and provide a
larger response to having negative information being disclosed. Thus, the general shape of
treatment effect heterogeneity and the resulting QTEs could be shifted to the left or right,
be compressed or stretched, or otherwise be transformed across subgroups without losing
their overall shape. In summary, economic theory predicts treatment effect heterogeneity
both within and between subgroups, motivating the development of tools to assess its ex-
tent in general, as well as in the specific context of the Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2017)
information provision experiment.
Last, beyond the advantages of the institutional structure, Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja
(2017) distinguishes itself from the growing body of work evaluating randomized interventions
in developing countries by having collected a rich detailed longitudinal dataset. Beginning
in 2004, approximately 12,000 grade 3 students were surveyed. The follow-up rate was over
96% in subsequent years. Schools also completed annual surveys providing rich information
on their operations as well as their inputs. A subset of households were also randomly
selected for parents to provide additional information on home inputs. In our study, to
facilitate comparisons we utilize the same control variables as Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja
(2017) and use a standardized grade 4 test score as our primary outcome variable to fully
explore treatment effect heterogeneity.
Table 1 shows child-level summary statistics by treatment status for our outcome and
subgroup variables. Our outcome variable, “Average test score, round 2,” is significantly
higher among children in the treated group (whose parents received the school report cards),
which is consistent with the findings in Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2017). The village-level
variables including literacy rate, number of households, school Herfindahl index, and average
wealth differ significantly between treatment and control group. Recall that randomization
occurred on the village level and not on the child level, and these significant differences
disappear in village-level comparisons. We also find significant differences in the fraction of
government schools, high-scoring schools, and fathers with above-middle school education
by treatment status. Our testing approach incorporate propensity score weighting, which
allows us to balance treatment and control group based on these observed variables, see
Section 3.1. We consider how the distributional effects of the information experiment vary
across and within these subgroups in Section 3.2.
16Camargo et al. (2018) present evidence of heterogenous responses in Brazil and Koning and Van der
Wiel (2012) also find that test scores increase at a higher rate in schools ranked poorly in national newspapers
in the Netherlands.
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Table 1: Child-Level Summary statistics
No report card Report card Difference
Mean/Std.dev./N Mean/Std.dev./N p-value
Average test score, round 1 ´0.0134 ´0.0229 0.569
(0.942) (0.886)
5786 6324
Average test score, round 2 0.186 0.229 0.012
(1.004) (0.943)
6266 6538
Female child 0.425 0.431 0.438
(0.494) (0.495)
8443 8760
Child’s age 9.680 9.671 0.702
(1.505) (1.446)
6616 7117
Village literacy rate 38.46 36.26 0.000
(12.88) (10.63)
8443 8760
Number of households in village 708.3 797.3 0.000
(375.8) (591.0)
8443 8760
School Herfindahl index 0.181 0.183 0.092
(0.0680) (0.0676)
8443 8760
Village wealth 4498.5 4638.6 0.000
(median monthly expenditure) (1649.4) (1454.8)
8443 8760
Government school 0.675 0.698 0.003
(excluded category: private) (0.468) (0.459)
6617 7118
School size 251.6 248.7 0.386
(199.5) (194.9)
6617 7118
High scoring school 0.499 0.486 0.096
(above 60th percentile) (0.500) (0.500)
8443 8760
Mother’s education above middle 0.325 0.333 0.498
school (0.469) (0.471)
3097 3278
Father’s education above middle 0.630 0.590 0.001
school (0.483) (0.492)
3090 3278
Source: Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2017).
Notes: Means, standard deviations (in parentheses), and numbers of observations for children in villages that did not and
did receive the information experiment treatment. p-values for the t-test of the null hypothesis that the means do not differ
between treatment and control group.
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3 Methodology
In this section, we begin by introducing three tests for treatment effect heterogeneity in the
full sample. The data generating set-up for the testing problem is as follows. Let Di be a
random variable that takes values in t0, 1u, where Di “ 1 means participation in the program
by individual i and Di “ 0 being left in the control group. Let Yi be the observed outcome
of individual i defined as
Yi “ Y0iDi ` Y1ip1´Diq,
where Y1i denotes the potential outcome of individual i treated in the program and Y0i that
of the same individual not treated in the program. Let Xi be a vector of observed covariates
pertaining to individual i. The researcher observes a random sample of pYi, Di, Xiqni“1.
Our parameter of focus is the QTE defined by
q∆τ “ q1,τ ´ q0,τ ,
where for each τ P p0, 1q and d P t0, 1u,
qd,τ “ inftq P R : P tYdi ď qu ě τu.
Throughout this paper, we assume selection on observables (i.e. the conditional independence
of pY1i, Y0iq and Di given Xi) and the non-overlap condition (i.e., there exists η P p0, 1{2q
such that η ď P tDi “ 1|Xi “ xu ď 1´ η for all x in the support of Xi.) These assumptions
ensure the identification of q∆τ . See Firpo (2007) for details on the efficient estimation of
QTE. Motivated by the discussion in the previous section, we propose three additional tests
for treatment effect heterogeneity (across τ ’s) both within and between subgroups.
3.1 Treatment Effect Heterogeneity Without Subgroups
Each test we introduce requires estimates of QTEs that in the full sample are calculated by
subtracting the unconditional outcome at quantile τ for the control group from the respective
outcome at quantile τ for the treatment group. To control for possible selection on observed
variables into treatment and control groups, we weight the outcome variable by inverse
propensity score weights (IPSW). We define the IPSW as
ωˆ1i “ Di
pˆpXiq and ωˆ0i “
1´Di
1´ pˆpXiq
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for treated and control individuals, respectively, where Di is the treatment indicator, Xi is
a vector of observed characteristics, and pˆp¨q is the estimated propensity score.17 We then
obtain quantiles of the weighted outcome as follows:
qˆ1,τ “ arg min
q
nÿ
i“1
ωˆ1iρτ pYi ´ qq and
qˆ0,τ “ arg min
q
nÿ
i“1
ωˆ0iρτ pYi ´ qq ,
where ρτ pxq “ x¨pτ´1tx ď 0uq is the check function and n is the size of the full sample. That
is, qˆτ,1 and qˆτ,0 are the τ -th empirical quantiles of the propensity score weighted outcome
variable !
Yˆ1i
)n
i“1
“
"
YiDi
pˆpXiq
*n
i“1
and
!
Yˆ0i
)n
i“1
“
"
Yip1´Diq
1´ pˆpXiq
*n
i“1
for treatment and control group, respectively.
Formally, the estimated QTE at τ is then defined as
qˆ∆τ “ qˆ1,τ ´ qˆ0,τ .
Intuitively, the QTE is equal to the horizontal difference between the graphs of the uncon-
ditional outcome distributions of treatment and control group at quantile τ .
3.1.1 Testing for the Presence of Positive Quantile Treatment Effects
The first test is designed to determine whether an intervention had any detectable positive
effect on the outcome of interest.18 We consider the following null and alternative hypotheses:
H0 : q
∆
τ ď 0 for all τ P T
H1 : q
∆
τ ą 0 for some τ P T , (H.1)
where T Ă r0, 1s is the finite set of quantiles considered. The alternative hypothesis states
that there exists a positive treatment effect for at least one quantile. Therefore, the null
hypothesis is rejected if treatment has any positive effect on some range of the outcome
distribution, given reasonable power.
17Following Smith and Todd (2005) we use the propensity score for the full sample throughout our analysis
even when we investigate subgroups.
18The idea for this test has policy appeal since, given limited resources, policymakers first need to know if
individuals react to a specific policy intervention at all. In contrast, the average treatment effect may conceal
positive QTEs if they are entirely offset by negative QTEs in a different range of the outcome distribution.
11
To develop a bootstrap test of the null hypothesis of no positive treatment effect (H.1),
we consider a test statistic of the following form:
Tn “ max
τPT qˆ
∆
τ . (1)
Intuitively, since the null hypothesis states that all QTEs are weakly negative, the largest
observed QTE provides the clearest evidence against the null hypothesis (White, 2000). To
implement the test, we calculate a critical value using a bootstrap method. Specifically,
we first resample with replacement from the original sample B times and construct the
propensity score weighted outcomes Yˆ1˚i “ Y ˚i Di˚ {pˆ˚pXi˚ q and Yˆ0˚i “ Y ˚i p1´Di˚ q{p1´ pˆ˚pXi˚ qq,
where tY ˚i , Di˚ , Xi˚ uni“1 denotes each bootstrap sample and pˆ˚pXi˚ q the estimated propensity
score using the bootstrap sample. We construct bootstrap test statistics with bootstrap
number B: for b “ 1, . . . , B,
T ˚n,b “ max
τPT
 
qˆ∆˚τ ´ qˆ∆τ
(
, (2)
where qˆ∆˚τ “ qˆτ˚,1 ´ qˆτ˚,0 and qˆτ˚,1 and qˆτ˚,0 are the τ -th empirical quantiles of tYˆ1˚iuni“1 and
tYˆ0˚iuni“1, respectively. By subtracting qˆ∆τ we re-center the bootstrap test statistic in order
to impose the least favorable configuration under the null hypothesis. We then compare the
test statistic (1) to the bootstrap critical value, which is equal to the p1 ´ αq-th empirical
quantile of the B bootstrap test statistics (2), where α is the nominal level of the test. We
reject the null hypothesis if the test statistic exceeds the critical value. Rejection of the
null hypothesis (H.1) indicates evidence for positive treatment effects for some range of the
outcome distribution.
3.1.2 Testing for General Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
We now test for treatment effect homogeneity, which provides an answer to the policy-
relevant question of whether individuals across quantiles differ in their response to a par-
ticular intervention. While one may obtain information from a visual inspection of QTEs
across quantiles of the outcome distribution, a formal test is necessary to properly account
for sampling variations.
We consider the following hypotheses:
H0 : q
∆
τ “ c for all τ P T and for some c P R
H1 : q
∆
τ ‰ c for some τ P T and for all c P R. (H.2)
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The alternative hypothesis indicates heterogeneity of QTE across quantiles. When the null
hypothesis is rejected, it suggests evidence for differential reactions by individuals to the
treatment depending on where on the outcome distribution they are located.19
To test (H.2) we construct the following test statistic:
Tn “ max
τPT
ˇˇ
qˆ∆τ ´ q¯∆
ˇˇ
, (3)
where q¯∆ “ 1|T |
ř
τPT qˆ
∆
τ is the sample mean of the estimated QTEs. That is, we set the
constant c in (H.2) equal to the sample mean, q¯∆, and subtract it from the estimated QTEs,
so the test statistic will be small if the QTEs are very similar across τ .20 The max appears
in equation (3) to detect the existence of quantiles at which the deviation of the QTE from
its mean occurs.
We then follow the same bootstrap approach as in Section 3.1.1 above and calculate the
following bootstrap test statistic:
T ˚n,b “ max
τPT
ˇˇ
qˆ∆˚τ ´ qˆ∆τ ´
`
q¯∆˚ ´ q¯∆˘ˇˇ . (4)
The bootstrap test also incorporates re-centering in order to impose the null restriction. To
test null hypothesis (H.2), we compare the test statistic (3) to the critical value obtained from
the bootstrap test statistics (4), which is equal to the p1 ´ αq-th quantile of the bootstrap
distribution of Tn˚,b, b “ 1, . . . , B.
3.1.3 Testing for Which Quantiles the Treatment Effect Is Positive
The next test employs a multiple testing approach to identify the ranges of the outcome
distribution that exhibit positive treatment effects. This is important since rejecting null
hypothesis (H.1) only informs us that individuals in some range of the outcome distribution
exhibit positive QTEs, and rejecting (H.2) just provides evidence that the treatment effect
is not constant across the outcome distribution. The identified range can be of considerable
19Note that testing for treatment effect heterogeneity has appeared in Appendix E of Heckman, Smith, and
Clements (1997) though in a different form. Their null hypothesis posits that the variance of the individual
treatment effect Y1i´Y0i is zero, i.e. there is no treatment effect heterogeneity across individuals. On the other
hand, our null hypothesis allows for treatment effect heterogeneity across individuals. Our null hypothesis
rather states that the QTEs are constant across quantiles. After all, randomness of the individual treatment
effect appears to be a less interesting hypothesis to test, given that it is well accepted that individuals
have heterogeneous responses to policy interventions including experiments such as PROGRESA (see, e.g.,
Djebbari and Smith, 2008).
20Since the null hypothesis involves an equality, we take the absolute value of the difference between QTE
and mean QTE.
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interest for policymakers when they wish to define a target group for their policies in a
way that carries empirical support. We follow recent developments in the multiple testing
literature (see, e.g., Romano and Wolf, 2005a,b) and use a bootstrap based step-down method
to identify the quantiles for which positive treatment effects are present.21 To do so, it is
necessary to update the critical value at each step, for example by using a bootstrap method.
By combining bootstrap tests of inequality restrictions with multiple testing procedures, we
produce a testing procedure suitable for analyzing treatment heterogeneity that controls the
FWER at the desired level.
We first define individual hypothesis testing problems as follows: for each τ in a range
T Ă r0, 1s,
H0,τ : q
∆
τ ď 0
H1,τ : q
∆
τ ą 0. (H.3)
Then the goal is to find a set of individual hypotheses, for which the null is false, in a
way that controls the FWER asymptotically. The FWER here is the probability that we
mistakenly declare a positive QTE for at least one τ P T .
To implement this approach, we follow Romano and Wolf (2005a) and Romano and
Shaikh (2010) by conducting stepwise elimination of quantiles using the bootstrap. More
specifically, setting T1 “ T , we find the smallest cˆ1 such that
1
B
Bÿ
b“1
1
 
T ˚n,bpT1q ą cˆ1
( ď α,
where Tn˚,bpT1q “ maxτPT1
 
qˆ∆˚τ ´ qˆ∆τ
(
denotes the bootstrap one-sided test statistic using
the b-th bootstrap sample and α is the level of the test. That is, at cˆ1, the fraction of test
statistics across the B bootstrap samples that exceed that critical value is at most α. Then,
we retain those quantiles that do not exceed the critical value cˆ1, i.e. we define
T2 “
 
τ P T1 : qˆ∆τ ď cˆ1
(
,
so T2 is a subset of T1. Now, we construct Tn˚,bpT2q “ maxτPT2
 
qˆ∆˚τ ´ qˆ∆τ
(
, find cˆ2 such that
1
B
Bÿ
b“1
1
 
T ˚n,bpT2q ą cˆ2
( ď α,
21Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2010) provide a recent overview of testing procedures proposed in the
literature since the very conservative Bonferroni correction.
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and define
T3 “
 
τ P T2 : qˆ∆τ ď cˆ2
(
.
This procedure is repeated until at step k, we obtain Tk “
 
τ P Tk´1 : qˆ∆τ ď cˆk´1
(
such that
no further element of Tk is eliminated (i.e. Tk “ Tk´1). Then the resulting set Tk is the
subset of T such that there is no empirical support for positive and statistically significant
treatment effects at quantiles τ P Tk. Conversely, this procedure provides evidence for
positive treatment effects at quantiles in the set T zTk. From the result of Romano and
Shaikh (2010), it is not hard to show that this multiple testing procedure asymptotically
controls the FWER at α.22
3.2 Incorporating Subgroups
The preceding three tests did not consider treatment effect heterogeneity across different
subgroups. Tests involving subgroups can be useful when policymakers want to identify
subgroups defined by observed variables that exhibit differential treatment effects, or when
they are interested in the extent of heterogeneity within subgroups. For example, given
limited resources, policymakers may be reluctant to extend programs to groups where a
significant fraction does not receive gains. Finally, and consistent with the arguments in
Lee and Shaikh (2014) and Fink, McConnell, and Vollmer (2014), it is important to develop
tools for statistical inference in this setting that account for dependence both within and
across subgroups.
We assume that the subgroup vector Zi is a subvector of Xi, so we write Xi “ pX1i, Ziq,
where X1i indicates the vector that is not included in Zi. Let us define for each z in the
support of Zi, τ P p0, 1q, and d P t0, 1u,
qd,τ pzq “ inftq P R : P tYdi ď q|Zi “ zu ě τu,
where Zi is the subgroup vector taking values from a finite set Z “ ŚJj“1Zj, where Zj is
the set of values from the j-th category (i.e. each category j corresponds to one observed
variable that can take on multiple values). Hence q1,τ pzq and q0,τ pzq are the quantiles of the
outcome variable in the treatment and control groups conditional on subgroup z. Then the
subgroup QTE for subgroup z is defined by
q∆τ pzq “ q1,τ pzq ´ q0,τ pzq.
22See Online Appendix B for a sketch of proofs for the validity of all testing procedures introduced in the
paper.
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To account for covariates in the analyses, we continue to use inverse propensity score weight-
ing. First, note that we can identify qd,τ pzq by
qd,τ pzq “ arg min
q
Erωdiρτ pYi ´ qq |Zi “ zs, d “ 1, 0,
where
ω1i “ Di
ppXiq and ω0i “
1´Di
1´ ppXiq .
Thus, we estimate qd,τ pzq by
qˆd,τ pzq “ arg min
q
1řn
i“1 1 tZi “ zu
nÿ
i“1
ωˆdiρτ pYi ´ qq1 tZi “ zu ,
with the weights given by
ωˆ1i “ Di
pˆpXiq and ωˆ0i “
1´Di
1´ pˆpXiq .
3.2.1 Testing for Which Quantiles and Subgroups the Treatment Effect Is Pos-
itive
This test extends the test of hypothesis (H.3) to a setting with subgroups. That is, we
identify the quantile-subgroup cells that have statistically significantly positive treatment
effects. We consider the following individual hypotheses: for each τ P T and z P Z,
H0,τ,z : q
∆
τ pzq ď 0
H1,τ,z : q
∆
τ pzq ą 0. (H.4)
Hence, we test a total number of |T |ˆ|Z| hypotheses. We denote the set of quantile-subgroup
cells by W “ T ˆ Z.
The test is constructed as follows. First, by resampling with replacement from the original
sample, we construct Yˆ1˚i “ Y ˚i Di˚ {pˆ˚pXi˚ q and Yˆ0˚i “ Y ˚i p1 ´ Di˚ q{p1 ´ pˆ˚pXi˚ qq. Then we
take our bootstrap one-sided test statistic to be
T ˚n,bpWq “ maxpτ,zqPW
 
qˆ∆˚τ pzq ´ qˆ∆τ pzq
(
, (5)
where qˆ∆˚τ pzq “ qˆτ˚,1pzq´ qˆτ˚,0pzq, qˆτ˚,1pzq and qˆτ˚,0pzq are the empirical quantiles of tYˆ1˚iuni“1 and
tYˆ0˚iuni“1, respectively, at quantile τ within the samples with Zi˚ “ z. To perform multiple
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testing, we proceed by eliminating subgroup-quantile cells stepwise. At each step, we retain
those pτ, zq cells for which no evidence for positive treatment effect can be found. That is,
pτ, zq cells that are eliminated throughout this procedure constitute the subgroup-quantile
groups with evidence for positive treatment effects.
Specifically, we take W1 “ T ˆ Z, and find the minimum cˆ1 such that
1
B
Bÿ
b“1
 
T ˚n,bpW1q ą cˆ1
( ď α,
where Tn˚,bpW1q is defined in equation (5) and α is the desired FWER. We define
W2 “
 pτ, zq PW1 : qˆ∆τ pzq ď cˆ1(
and construct Tn˚,bpW2q “ maxpτ,zqPW2
 
qˆ∆˚τ pzq ´ qˆ∆τ pzq
(
to find the minimum cˆ2 such that
1
B
Bÿ
b“1
 
T ˚n,bpW2q ą cˆ2
( ď α.
We then define
W3 “
 pτ, zq PW2 : qˆ∆τ pzq ď cˆ2( .
The process is repeated until we obtain Wk “
 pτ, zq PWk´1 : qˆ∆τ pzq ď cˆk´1( for some k
such that no further element of Wk is eliminated. Then the resulting set Wk is the subset
of W such that there is no empirical support that the treatment effect at quantile-subgroup
pair pτ, zq P Wk is positive. This procedure will yield all the combinations of subgroups
and quantiles where positive treatment effects are present; specifically they are given by
quantile-subgroup pairs pτ, zq PWzWk.
3.2.2 Testing for Subgroup-Specific Treatment Effect Heterogeneity Across Quan-
tiles
Here we focus on the question of whether differences across subgroups can explain the ob-
served heterogeneity of QTEs in the full sample. More specifically, we search for evidence that
all subgroups exhibit heterogeneity of treatment effects across different quantiles τ P p0, 1q:
H0 : q
∆
τ pzq “ cz for all τ P T , for some cz P R, and for all z P Z
H1 : q
∆
τ pzq ‰ cz for some τ P T , for all cz P R, and for some z P Z. (H.5)
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The null hypothesis states that the heterogeneity in treatment effects disappears when we
condition on Zi. In other words, it posits that the QTEs are constant across quantiles within
all subgroups z. However, the null hypothesis still allows for treatment effect heterogeneity
across different subgroups. Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests the presence of QTE
heterogeneity across quantiles even after we control for Zi. Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes
(2017) ask exactly this question. In contrast to their paper, however, we do not constrain
the treatment effect to be constant within subgroups.23
We check the validity of the above assumption by testing Hypothesis (H.5) using the
following test statistic:
Tn “ max
zPZ maxτPT
ˇˇ
qˆ∆τ pzq ´ q¯∆pzq
ˇˇ
, (6)
where q¯∆pzq “ 1|T |
ř
τPT qˆ
∆
τ pzq is the sample mean of the estimated QTEs for each subgroup.
As with test statistic (3), we impose the null hypothesis by subtracting q¯∆pzq. For each
subgroup, the highest deviation of the estimated QTEs from their sample mean provides
the clearest evidence against the null hypothesis. Then to obtain a test statistic that covers
all subgroups z P Z, we take the maximum value over each subgroup’s test statistic. In-
tuitively, we search for evidence that there exists a subgroup that exhibits treatment effect
heterogeneity, so we restrict our attention to the subgroups that have the largest degree of
heterogeneity.
To construct a bootstrap critical value, we consider the following bootstrap test statistic
that is an analog of (4) with subgroups:
T ˚n,b “ max
zPZ maxτPT
ˇˇ
qˆ∆˚τ pzq ´ qˆ∆τ pzq ´
`
q¯∆˚pzq ´ q¯∆pzq˘ˇˇ . (7)
The test statistic in equation (6) is compared to the bootstrap critical value, which equals
the p1´αq-th quantile of the bootstrap test statistics (7) as described above. This test of hy-
pothesis (H.5) provides a simple and flexible way to see if most treatment effect heterogeneity
across quantiles is in fact due to treatment effect heterogeneity across subgroups.
3.2.3 Testing for Which Subgroups Treatment Effects Are Heterogenous
The test of hypothesis (H.5) presented in equation (6) considers whether treatment effect
heterogeneity across quantiles exists even after controlling for subgroups. If we reject null
hypothesis (H.5), we may also be interested in identifying the subgroups that exhibit QTE
heterogeneity. The next test considers this objective by exploring subgroup by subgroup, if
23In the test in Section 3.2.3 below we additionally adjust for multiple testing while also relaxing the
assumption of constant subgroup-specific treatment effects.
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there is treatment effect heterogeneity within subgroups. For each z P Z, we test
H0,z : q
∆
τ,1pzq “ cz for all τ P T for some cz P R
H1,z : q
∆
τ,1pzq ‰ cz for some τ P T for all cz P R. (H.6)
The null hypothesis (H.6) posits that the QTEs are constant within subgroup. This test can
identify the subgroups that exhibit heterogeneity of QTE while accounting for dependencies
both between quantiles and between subgroups z P Z. The test of (H.6) differs from the
test of (H.5) by not conditioning on z. The test of (H.6) examines treatment effect het-
erogeneity separately for each subgroup z and finds subgroups that exhibit treatment effect
heterogeneity; whereas the test fo hypothesis (H.5) considers if treatment effect heterogeneity
disappears.24
We consider the following test statistic:
Tnpzq “ max
τPT
ˇˇ
qˆ∆τ pzq ´ q¯∆pzq
ˇˇ
, (8)
which is analog to the test statistic (3) with QTEs calculated by subgroup. As before, we
follow Romano and Wolf (2005a) and eliminate the subgroups, for which we cannot reject
the null hypothesis (H.6) in a step-down procedure. Then the remaining subgroups (if any)
are the ones for which we reject the null hypothesis of no treatment effect heterogeneity. The
bootstrap test statistic is defined as
T ˚n,bpZ1q “ max
zPZ1
max
τPT
ˇˇ
qˆ∆˚τ pzq ´ qˆ∆τ pzq ´
`
q¯∆˚pzq ´ q¯∆pzq˘ˇˇ , (9)
where we first take Z1 “ Z. We then find bootstrap critical values cˆz,1 for each subgroup z
such that
1
B
Bÿ
b“1
1
 
T ˚n,bpZ1q ą cˆz,1
( ď α
and define
Z2 “ tz : Tnpzq ď cˆz,1u ,
i.e. Z2 is the set of subgroups, for which the test statistic (8) does not exceed the critical value.
Hence z P Z2 are subgroups that do not exhibit significant treatment effect heterogeneity.
We then repeat these steps with Z2, find a critical values cˆz,1 analogously, and so on, until
24This test nevertheless differs from testing for treatment effect heterogeneity (hypothesis (H.3) for the
entire sample) separately for each subgroup since we use the Romano and Wolf (2005a) approach to identify
the subgroup(s) that exhibit heterogeneity in QTEs.
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no additional subgroup is eliminated (resulting in the set of subgroups Zk). Hence, there is
evidence for treatment effect heterogeneity for subgroups z P ZzZk.
4 Empirical Application
In this section, we obtain new insights extending the findings of Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja
(2017) by conducting the battery of tests described in the preceding section. Our analysis
focuses on the average of test scores across three subjects after random assignment as our
outcome variable and estimate QTEs of access to report cards for percentiles 1 to 99 using the
Firpo (2007) estimator.25 To balance covariates between the treatment and control groups,
we estimate the propensity score pˆpxq using a parametric logit specification. Specifically, we
include district fixed effects, and village wealth, literary rate, school Herfindahl index, and
number of households. For the results that follow, we set the level of each test to α “ 0.05.
All test results are based on bootstraps with B “ 999.
Figure 1 shows our estimated QTEs for the full sample along with 90 percent pointwise
confidence intervals.26 We find pointwise significant and positive treatment effects extending
from the first to the 82nd percentile. Starting with the 83th percentile the point estimates
for treatment effects become negative but the pointwise confidence intervals include zero.
Table 2 summarizes the test results for hypotheses (H.1) and (H.2) proposed in Section
3.1. First, we test the null hypothesis of no positive treatment effect at any percentile. As
shown in Figure 1, the largest QTE (which occurs at the third percentile) equals 0.394, so
this value appears in the first row of Table 2. With the bootstrap critical value of 0.223, we
reject the null hypothesis at 5 percent. The associated p-value equals 0.0017. Thus, there
is clear evidence that the information provision had the desired effect of increasing student
performance for at least some individuals. Next, we present results from the test of no
treatment effect heterogeneity across quantiles (H.2). The test statistic, which is calculated
as the largest deviation from the mean estimated QTE (q¯∆ “ 0.0583), equals 0.33. With a
bootstrap critical value of 0.236, we also reject this null hypothesis at 5 percent with a p-
value of 0.0119. This result implies that treatment effects are heterogenous across quantiles,
thereby indicating that individuals vary in their response to the report cards.
25To infer treatment effects for specific individuals from QTEs we have to assume that there are no rank
reversals in the test score distribution between the treatment and control groups. While this assumption
is likely violated, positive QTEs imply that the treatment has a positive effect for some interval of the test
score distribution.
26We show 90 percent confidence intervals to make them comparable to the multiple testing results, which
are obtained from one-sided tests that control the FWER at 5 percent.
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Note: Multiple testing results show quantiles for which the QTE is positive at a FWER of 5%
(see Section 3.1.3).
Figure 1: Quantile Treatment Effects and Multiple Testing Results, No Subgroups
Having rejected the null hypothesis of no treatment effect heterogeneity, we now identify
the range of the test score distribution where positive treatment effects are located, i.e. we test
hypothesis (H.3). As described in Section 3.1.3, this test accounts for potential dependencies
across quantiles of the same outcome variable and the number of individual hypotheses
(|T | “ 99). The shaded area in Figure 1 corresponds to the set T zTk, i.e. the percentiles
where the treatment effect remains significant using a FWER of α “ 0.05. Examining the
plot we observe that the set of significantly positive QTEs supports the distributional effects
predicted by the underlying theory. However, we find that individuals located between the
Table 2: Testing for Presence of Positive QTEs and QTE Heterogeneity Without Subgroups
Test statistic Critical value at 5% p-value
Test of (H.1) 0.394 0.223 0.0017
Test of (H.2) 0.33 0.236 0.0119
Notes: This table shows test results for hypotheses (H.1) and (H.2), i.e. we test that there is no positive
treatment effect for all quantiles and that the treatment effect is the same for all quantiles, respectively.
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26th and 82nd and the 21st and 23rd percentiles of the test score distribution do not exhibit
significant QTEs once we adjust for multiple testing. The smallest and largest quantiles at
which QTEs are significantly positive correspond to gains of 0.07 and 0.394, respectively.
Hence, we can conclude that the benefits of this particular form of accountability are more
confined than one would otherwise find based on traditional statistical inference that ignores
potential dependencies and testing at multiple percentiles. We find that there is a more
limited range of individuals whose academic outcomes truly increase when assigned to the
treatment group.
Next, we present results incorporating subgroups using the tests described in Section 3.2.
Economic theory predicts that individuals with different observed characteristics may react
differently to the same set of information. In particular, individual and village characteristics
may determine for which range of the test score distribution we observe an increase or
decrease in test score performance. Following Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2017), we consider
subgroups defined by child characteristics, education background of their parents, type of
school and characteristics of the villages themselves.27
Figure 2 presents QTEs conditional on child gender and child predetermined baseline test
scores. These figures provide an easy and intuitive way to check which subgroups benefit from
being assigned to receive report cards (heterogeneity across subgroups). In addition, we can
inspect the figure for each subgroup to determine the portion of the student test score dis-
tribution in which individuals exhibit positive subgroup-specific QTEs (heterogeneity within
subgroup). Shaded areas continue to denote significant QTEs based on our multiple testing
procedure of testing hypothesis (H.4).
The top panel of Figure 2 presents QTEs for child gender subgroups. The effect of the
access to report cards on test scores is larger for girls throughout the test score distribution.
For boys, there is no statistically significant positive effect above the 12th percentile (based
on the point-wise confidence intervals). When adjusting inference for multiple testing, we
find significant effects among girls in the 1st to 14th percentile and boys in the 2nd to 8th
percentile. The second panel considers subgroups defined by whether the child’s baseline
test score was above or below the median. The estimated QTEs and point-wise confidence
intervals in Figure 2b show that it is mostly children with a below-median baseline test
score who benefit from the report card experiment. When we adjust inference for multiple
testing, however, only children in the very top percentile of the post-experiment test score
27Note that in our application the number of hypotheses being tested is quite small particularly relative
to genomic studies from genome wide association studies. If the number of hypotheses were large it is well
known that FWER controlling procedures typically have low power, and in response Gu and Shen (2017)
propose an optimal false discovery rate controlling method.
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Figure 2: Quantile Treatment Effects and Multiple Testing Results, by Child Characteristics
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distribution who scored below the median at baseline exhibit significantly positive QTEs.
In addition, children who scored above the median at baseline and whose post-experiment
score falls in the first percentile also see a significant effect of information provision.28
Next, we construct subgroups based on village characteristics. Figure 3 shows the esti-
mated subgroup-specific QTEs and multiple testing results. We find significant treatment
effects are predominantly for children in villages with below-median wealth, above-median
literacy rates, below-median school concentration (measured by the school Herfindahl In-
dex), and above-median size. From a policy perspective, it is may be important to know
that report cards improve children’s test scores in relatively poor villages. At the same time,
providing written report cards to parents may not be a successful strategy in villages with low
literacy rates. In general, these results are important because they can show policymakers
which subgroups should be targeted with an accountability program.
Finally, we consider subgroups defined by the combination of school ownership type (gov-
ernment or private) with one of two different measures of student performance (school level
and relative). We first create subgroups by interacting school ownership with school perfor-
mance in the baseline test to yield four subgroups.29 Figure 4 illustrates the estimation and
multiple testing results. We find that significantly positive QTEs are concentrated among
low-scoring children in relatively high-performing government schools and high-scoring chil-
dren in low-performing private schools. Moreover, consistent with the negative average
treatment effect reported in Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2017) we do not find any positive
effects among children in high-performing private schools.
The second student performance measure we consider pertains to the child’s performance
at the baseline test relative to his or her school’s performance. Specifically, we construct
subgroups by dividing the sample into groups defined by the combination of school ownership
and whether the child performed above or below the median test score of their respective
school at baseline (high and low achieving students, respectively).30 Figure 5 shows that
children in government schools only benefit from the report cards if they are located in the
bottom of the test score distribution irrespective of whether they scored above or below
28The data also include information on parental educational attainment and monetary and time inputs
into the children’s human capital. However, the parental survey was only fielded to a third of the sample,
and the smaller sample size does not give us enough power to conduct our multiple testing corrections. The
results in Table 3 also indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no treatment effect heterogeneity
across subgroups for mother’s and father’s education.
29Specifically, following Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2017) a school is defined as high-performing if its
mean baseline test score exceeds the 60th percentile of all schools’ mean scores.
30We thank Jishnu Das for pointing out the distinction between these two baseline performance measures.
Table VII in Online Appendix III of Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2017) shows average treatment effects by
children’s baseline performance relative to their school.
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Figure 4: Quantile Treatment Effects and Multiple Testing Results by School Type and
Performance
the median of their school’s test score at baseline. In addition, the QTEs are significantly
positive under corrections for multiple testing among children who score above the 90th
percentile and are enrolled in a private school where they scored below the within school
median at baseline.
Taken together, our results in Figures 4 and 5 provide additional nuance on the findings
of Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2017) related to which students in which schools gain from
access to report cards. Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2006) motivate the valuable additional
policy insights provided by distributional effects as showing what mean estimates can miss.
In Figure 4, our evidence of treatment effect heterogeneity is masked if one estimates average
treatment effects even conditional on school type and performance. Further, in Figure 5,
while the main result is consistent with Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2017) who find that
low achieving students benefit from the report card intervention more than high achieving
students, we provide additional insights by showing that this benefit is confined to the top
decile among low achieving students.
We now formally test for treatment effect heterogeneity between and within subgroups.
Table 3 presents the results for hypothesis (H.5) for the same subgroups as above. This
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Figure 5: Quantile Treatment Effects and Multiple Testing Results by School Type and
Child’s Performance Relative to School Performance
null hypothesis posits that there are no differences across subgroups that can explain the
observed heterogeneity of QTEs in the full sample. We can reject (H.5) for all but two sets
of subgroups at a level of 5 percent. The p-value is largest for subgroups defined by mother’s
and father’s education. Hence, for these two subgroup categories, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the treatment effect is constant across test score percentiles for all subgroups
at the 5 percent level. Overall, however, we conclude that differences across subgroups do not
explain the observed distributional treatment effects in the whole sample. Our test relaxes
the strong assumption of treatment effect homogeneity within subgroups that is implicit in
Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2017).
The tests of hypothesis (H.6) shown in Table 4 additionally account for potential depen-
dencies within and across subgroups. These test results provide additional insight beyond
testing (H.5) because they identify the individual subgroups within a class of subgroups that
exhibit treatment effect heterogeneity. In these results, a p-value below 0.05 indicates that
the corresponding subgroup exhibits a statistically significant amount of treatment effect
heterogeneity across the test score distribution. In each and every subgroup category, we
find evidence of treatment effect heterogeneity. These results clearly suggest a substantial
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Table 3: Testing for Treatment Effect Heterogeneity Between Subgroups
Subgroup category Test statistic Critical value at 5% p-value
Child’s gender 0.394 0.292 0.006
Child’s baseline test score 0.516 0.421 0.014
Mother’s education 0.292 0.888 0.985
Father’s education 0.312 0.963 0.992
Village wealth 0.73 0.343 0
Village literacy rate 0.545 0.358 0
School Herfindahl Index 0.494 0.295 0.002
Village size 0.501 0.389 0.014
School type and school performance 1.166 0.624 0
School type and child’s performance 1.468 0.633 0
relative to school
Notes: This table shows test results for hypothesis (H.5), i.e. these tests show for which subgroups
categories we can reject treatment effects that are homogenous within subgroups for all subgroups.
amount of treatment effect heterogeneity between subgroups and across the student perfor-
mance distribution within subgroups.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we employ six general tests for treatment effect heterogeneity in settings with
selection on observables. These tests allow researchers to provide policymakers with guidance
on complex patterns of treatment effect heterogeneity both within and across subgroups. In
the present context, the results can guide policymakers in adjusting how information on
student performance is provided, for example by introducing more (or different) conditions
across villages. In contrast to much of the existing literature, these tests make corrections for
multiple testing and therefore provide valid inference under dependence between subgroups
and quantiles. Further, our tests generalize the idea of tests considered in Bitler, Gelbach,
and Hoynes (2017) by not restricting treatment effects to be constant across quantiles within
a subgroup when determining if the distributional heterogeneity across the full sample is
characterized by subgroups.
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Table 4: Testing Which Subgroups Exhibit Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
Subgroup category Test statistic p-value
Child’s gender
Female 0.394 0
Male 0.306 0
Child’s baseline test score
Above median 0.516 0
Below median 0.506 0
Village wealth
Above Median 0.19 0.01
Below Median 0.73 0
Village literacy rate
Above median 0.545 0
Below median 0.121 0.01
School Herfindahl Index
Above median 0.224 0
Below median 0.494 0
Village size
Above median 0.5 0
Below median 0.155 0.02
School type and school performance
High scoring govern. 1.073 0
Low scoring govern. 0.226 0
High scoring private 0.0754 0
Low scoring private 1.166 0
School type and child’s performance relative to school
Govern./high achieving 0.593 0
Govern./low achieving 0.277 0
Private/high achieving 0.101 0
Private/low achieving 1.468 0
Notes: This table shows test results for hypothesis (H.6), i.e. these tests show for which subgroups in
each subgroup category we can reject homogenous treatment effects. p-values are calculated using a grid
with step size 0.005. Hence an entry of zero indicates that the corresponding p-value is below 0.005.
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Using data from Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2017), we not only present evidence of con-
siderable heterogeneity of the effects of access to report cards on student achievement for
most subgroups, but show in which subgroups and which test score quantiles within sub-
groups the benefits of information provision are highest. In addition, our empirical analysis
emphasizes the importance of correcting for multiple testing. Testing across different sub-
groups is policy relevant, and while Crump et al. (2008) provide an approach to select which
subpopulations to study, our tests go further by considering treatment effect heterogeneity
conditional on observable characteristics.
Given the considerable attention policymakers pay to developing accountability programs
worldwide, our results highlight for which groups targeted information provision would likely
yield higher returns. Further, these returns should exceed programs that disclose school
quality to parents of all students. That said, education policymakers face additional challenge
from incorporating evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects into the design of any policy
that may lead to different school choice. While Pareto improvements in welfare can easily
be achieved in social and labor policy using ex-post targeted transfers, the effectiveness of
redistributing students across schools also depends on how peer groups influence academic
outcomes.31
We would like to conclude by emphasizing that our multiple testing approach is generally
applicable in various other ways beyond what this paper demonstrated. First, the tests can
be applied to situations with multiple treatments (e.g., List, Shaikh, and Xu, 2016) or
situations where there is selection on unobservables that explore if there is heterogeneity in
marginal treatment effects (e.g., Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005; Brinch, Mogstad, and Wiswall,
2017). Second, instead of using inverse propensity score weighting, we may directly use the
conditional distribution functions or conditional quantile functions to identify the treatment
effects as proposed by Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Melly (2013). Extending their
proposal to multiple testing procedures to test for treatment effect heterogeneity across the
distribution or quantile function with or without subgroups has the potential to complement
this paper by expanding insights in empirical microeconomics.
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